Background and Mechanism
Standard commercial foundation models reliably refuse red-teaming requests due to safety alignment. To conduct automated penetration testing, security practitioners increasingly turn to 'abliterated' models. By measuring refusal activations and subtracting that vector from model weights, models retain reasoning capabilities while removing guardrail refusals. Shrivu Shankar highlights dealignai/DeepSeek-V4.1-Flash-1017-UNCENSORED-FP8 deployed on Modal inference (e.g. B300:4 GPUs).
Architecture of agents-on-modal
The companion repository sshh12/agents-on-modal decouples three operational components:
- Models: Open-weight options (DeepSeek-V4, GLM-5.3, Qwen3.8) served via SGLang or llama.cpp on Modal GPUs with automatic scale-to-zero capabilities.
- Harness: Compatibility with developer agent CLIs, specifically Claude Code and Codex CLI.
- Sandbox: Runtime environments covering local execution, isolated throwaway Docker containers (full internet, no LAN access), or parallel Modal Sandboxes.
An in-container gateway bridges protocol differences, allowing harness tools to seamlessly interact with standard OpenAI-compatible endpoints. Sandboxes can also route egress traffic through residential HTTP/SOCKS5 proxies while keeping model token traffic direct.
Practical Findings
During an experiment tasking roughly 100 agent instances with hacking the author's accounts, agents uncovered IDOR vulnerabilities and credential issues in legacy hackathon projects and conducted OSINT and brute-force tests. The results highlight both the efficacy and attack surface introduced by autonomous agent workflows.