Table of Contents
Conclusion
Key Takeaways, Resources
Why Structured Incident Reports?
The threat landscape encompasses two extremes: Massive DDoS attacks that flood networks with data volumes of several terabits per second, and targeted application attacks on CMSs like TYPO3, which can remain undetected for months. A structured report bridges the gap between technical analysis and strategic risk management.
DDoS Attacks
- Volumetric: Record attacks reach 7.3 Tbps (terabits per second)
- Multi-vector: Combination of different attack methods simultaneously
- Volatile: Leave no files behind – traces only in network logs
TYPO3 Compromises
- Deeply embedded in business logic
- Often undetected for months (Dwell Time)
- Distinguishing Core vs. Extension is critical for responsibilities
Harmonising Frameworks
Various organisations use different standards – this leads to inconsistent reports. This guide combines two proven approaches:
- SANS Model: 6 phases from Preparation to Lessons Learned
- NIST SP 800-61: Risk-based approach with 4 core phases
SANS: 6 Phases
NIST SP 800-61: 4 Phases
Documentation begins in the identification phase – not in hindsight. The "logbook principle" prevents cognitive bias and data loss. Consolidation into the post-mortem occurs later.
Severity Rating
Subjective assessments ("The attack felt severe") are useless. Objective evaluation is based on:
| Rating System | Focus | Application |
|---|---|---|
| NCISS (CISA) | Functional impact, information loss, recovery effort | General incident evaluation |
| DDoS Resiliency Score | 7 levels from simple floods to multi-vector attacks | Specific to DDoS |
| CVSS | Technical severity of vulnerabilities | CVE rating |
Blameless Post-Mortems
Modern incident response does not look for scapegoats, but rather systemic failures. Instead of "Admin X forgot to apply the patch", the report asks: "Why did the process allow an unpatched system to remain in production?"
Methods such as the 5 Whys or Fishbone diagrams in RCA support this philosophy.
Master Template
The template is modular: A core module for every incident, supplemented by specialised modules for DDoS or TYPO3.
Module A: Metadata
This section serves as a quick orientation for C-level executives and external stakeholders – concise and free of technical jargon.
| Field | Example | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| Incident-ID | INC-2026-0142 | Unique reference |
| Erkennungszeitpunkt | 2026-01-21T14:32:00Z | Start of the timeline |
| Severity | High (NCISS 7.2) | Prioritisation |
| Status | Contained / Eradicated / Closed | Current status |
| Lead Analyst | M. Schneider | Responsibility |
Executive Summary (max. 200 words):
The narrative follows the Situation → Complication → Resolution schema:
"On 23 October 2026, our monitoring systems registered a massive surge in traffic to the primary web servers. Analysis confirmed a targeted DDoS attack, which briefly led to performance degradation. In parallel, attempted attacks exploiting a vulnerability in the TYPO3 backend were detected. By rerouting the traffic to a specialised filtering provider and immediately deploying security updates, normal operations were restored within 45 minutes. No personal data was stolen."
Module B: Timeline
The timeline is the heart of forensic reconstruction – precise timestamps detailing actions and system reactions.
Anomaly Detection
Security team alerted
Classification
Countermeasures activated
Normal operations
Module C: Technical Analysis
Here you gather facts for further analysis and system hardening.
Attack Vectors (TTPs): Description via the MITRE ATT&CK Framework – a public knowledge base of adversary tactics
T1498 - Network Denial of Service
└── T1498.001 - Direct Network Flood
└── T1498.002 - Reflection Amplification
T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application
└── TYPO3 Deserialization (CVE-2026-004)IoCs:
DDoS Post-Mortem
DDoS attacks leave no files on hard drives – the analysis relies exclusively on log data from network devices and filtering providers.
DDoS Metrics
Different metrics reveal different vulnerabilities. An attack with low bandwidth but an extremely high packet rate can be more devastating than a pure data flood attack.
| Metric | Unit | Targeted Bottleneck |
|---|---|---|
| Peak Bandwidth | Gbps / Tbps | Uplink capacity |
| Packets per Second | Mpps | Firewall State Tables |
| Requests per Second | RPS | Application Layer |
| Unique Source IPs | Anzahl | Botnet size (if not spoofed) |
| Attack Duration | Minuten/Stunden | Resource exhaustion |
Check whether the massive data attack served as a diversion while a stealth attack (e.g., Slowloris) was simultaneously targeting the application.
Impact Assessment
The severity is evaluated across three dimensions:
Operational Impact
- Loss of availability (total outage vs. slowdown)
- Collateral damage on shared infrastructure
- Affected services (API, VPN, email)
Financial Impact
- Costs for traffic filtering (excess usage)
- Lost revenue (for e-commerce)
- Personnel costs for incident handling
Reputational Impact
- Public perception (social media)
- Loss of trust among B2B partners
- Media coverage
DRS: Evaluation of attack complexity on a scale of 1-7:
Automated CVE Correlation
CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) is a standardised system for identifying security vulnerabilities. Each known vulnerability is assigned a unique identifier (e.g., CVE-2024-1234), which is used consistently worldwide – by security researchers, vendors, and IT teams.
Amplification Attacks: When Servers Become Amplifiers
In amplification attacks (also known as reflection attacks), attackers abuse third-party servers to act as amplifiers. The mechanism:
- A small request is sent to a vulnerable server – with a spoofed sender address (the victim's IP).
- The server responds to the apparent sender with a significantly larger volume of data.
- The victim is flooded with responses they never requested.
The Amplification Factor describes the amplification ratio: some protocols multiply the traffic by 500 times or more. With 100 Mbps of bandwidth, an attack exceeding 50 Gbps can be generated.
Relevance of CVE Correlation:
- Self-assessment: Are vulnerable services active within your own infrastructure? Are your own systems potentially acting as reflectors?
- Threat Intelligence: Which known vulnerabilities are currently being exploited globally – and is there a need for action?
| Protocol/Port | CVE | Amplification Factor | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| NTP (123/UDP) | CVE-2013-5211 | 556x | Monlist command |
| Memcached (11211/UDP) | CVE-2018-1000115 | 51.000x | UDP-Reflection |
| SLP (427/UDP) | CVE-2023-29552 | 2.200x | Service Location Protocol |
| DNS (53/UDP) | Multiple | 28-54x | Open Resolver |
| SSDP (1900/UDP) | Multiple | 30x | UPnP Discovery |
Example Entry: 'Traffic analysis shows that 40% of the UDP flood originated from source port 427. Deep Packet Inspection confirmed payloads typical for CVE-2023-29552. This points to a botnet utilising unpatched VMware ESXi instances as reflectors.'
TYPO3 Forensics
With TYPO3 as an enterprise CMS, making a precise distinction is vital: vulnerabilities in the TYPO3 Core (responsibility: TYPO3 GmbH/Association) versus vulnerabilities in extensions (responsibility: agency/developers). This distinction dictates reporting channels and responsibilities.
System Inventory
Before beginning the analysis, document the exact state of the system.
| Aspect | To Document | Security Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| TYPO3 Version | Exact version incl. patch level | LTS vs. Sprint? ELTS available? |
| Installation | Composer vs. Legacy (Non-Composer) | Composer enables auditing |
| PHP Environment | Version, Extensions, disable_functions | Dangerous functions active? |
| Extensions | List of all loaded extensions + versions | Flag abandoned extensions |
| Server | OS, Webserver, PHP-Handler | Known vulnerabilities? |
TYPO3 v11 and older no longer receive security patches without an ELTS contract.
Vulnerability Classes
Forensic Checklist
In the event of a suspected compromise (defacement, spamming, unexplained admin logins):
var/log/typo3_*.log – search for unusual backend logins, IP addressesbe_users and fe_users for unknown entriesfind fileadmin/ -name "*.php" -mtime -7 – PHP files in upload folderstx_scheduler_task for suspicious entriescomposer audit or manual comparison with security bulletinssys_template for injected JavaScript snippetsTYPO3 Security Team
Reporting vulnerabilities to the TYPO3 Security Team follows strict rules. The team operates on the principle of responsible disclosure.
Reporting to the Security Team requires thorough preparatory work. Ensure that the suspected vulnerability is reproducibly documented and does not stem from a misconfiguration in your own environment. Poorly researched reports tie up valuable resources from the volunteer team and delay the processing of genuine security issues.
Preparatory Measures
Before Reporting
- Do not discuss publicly – no posts in Slack, StackOverflow, or forums
- Verification – is the flaw reproducible in a currently supported version?
- Communicate securely – emails must be PGP-encrypted
Encryption Data
PGP ensures that only the Security Team can read the report:
- Key ID: C05FBE60
- Download: typo3.org/security
Email Template
This template meets the requirements of the TYPO3 Security Team:
Subject: Suspected Vulnerability in [Extension/Core] - [Short Description]
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
Dear TYPO3 Security Team,
I am writing to report a suspected security vulnerability in accordance
with your coordinated disclosure policy.
1. VULNERABILITY METADATA
-------------------------
Project: [Extension Key or "TYPO3 Core"]
Affected Versions: [e.g., 11.5.0 - 11.5.24]
Tested Version: [Your test environment]After Reporting
Confirmation
Evaluation
Fixing
Advisory
Strict silence must be maintained between reporting and publication. Any premature discussion enables zero-day attacks and endangers all TYPO3 installations worldwide.
Conclusion
A Security Incident Report combines technical excellence with communicative clarity. The template presented here integrates global standards (NIST/SANS) with the specific requirements of DDoS attacks and the TYPO3 security architecture.
DDoS + CVE Mapping
Traffic data is transformed into actionable threat intelligence. Which global vulnerabilities are being weaponised against us?
TYPO3 Forensics
Standardised reporting channels and forensic depth build trust and strengthen the open-source community.
Faster Response
Consistent application of these templates minimises the recovery time and legal risks.
Security is not a state, but a process – and this report is the protocol of that process.
Using as an AI Skill
The methodology of this article is available as a machine-readable skill for AI assistants. With it, Claude, ChatGPT, or other LLMs can generate structured incident reports according to NIST/SANS standards.
The skill is part of our open-source collection for AI-supported IT workflows: github.com/dirnbauer/webconsulting-skills
Example Prompts for the AI Assistant: