Table of Contents
Conclusion
Key Takeaways, Resources
Why Structured Incident Reports?
The threat landscape spans two extremes: massive DDoS attacks that flood networks with several terabits of traffic per second, and targeted application attacks on a CMS like TYPO3 that can go undetected for months. A structured report bridges technical analysis and strategic risk management.
DDoS Attacks
- Volumetric: Record attacks reach 7.3 Tbps (terabits per second)
- Multi-vector: Combination of different attack methods simultaneously
- Volatile: They leave no files behind, only traces in network logs
TYPO3 Compromises
- Deeply embedded in business logic
- Often undetected for months (Dwell Time)
- Telling Core from Extension apart is critical for assigning responsibility
Harmonising Frameworks
Different organisations follow different standards, which leads to inconsistent reports. This guide combines two proven approaches:
- SANS Model: 6 phases from Preparation to Lessons Learned
- NIST SP 800-61: Risk-based approach with 4 core phases
SANS: 6 Phases
NIST SP 800-61: 4 Phases
Documentation starts in the identification phase, not in hindsight. The "logbook principle" guards against cognitive bias and data loss; consolidation into the post-mortem comes later.
Severity Rating
Subjective judgements ("The attack felt severe") are useless. Objective evaluation rests on:
| Rating System | Focus | Application |
|---|---|---|
| NCISS (CISA) | Functional impact, information loss, recovery effort | General incident evaluation |
| DDoS Resiliency Score | 7 levels from simple floods to multi-vector attacks | Specific to DDoS |
| CVSS | Technical severity of vulnerabilities | CVE rating |
Blameless Post-Mortems
Modern incident response hunts for systemic failures, not scapegoats. Instead of "Admin X forgot to apply the patch", the report asks: "Why did the process allow an unpatched system to remain in production?"
Methods such as the 5 Whys or Fishbone diagrams in RCA support this philosophy.
Master Template
The template is modular: a core module for every incident, supplemented by specialised modules for DDoS or TYPO3.
Module A: Metadata
This section gives C-level executives and external stakeholders a quick orientation: concise and free of technical jargon.
| Field | Example | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| Incident-ID | INC-2026-0142 | Unique reference |
| Detection Time | 2026-01-21T14:32:00Z | Start of the timeline |
| Severity | High (NCISS 7.2) | Prioritisation |
| Status | Contained / Eradicated / Closed | Current status |
| Lead Analyst | M. Schneider | Responsibility |
Executive Summary (max. 200 words):
The narrative follows the Situation → Complication → Resolution pattern:
"On 23 October 2026, our monitoring systems registered a massive surge in traffic to the primary web servers. Analysis confirmed a targeted DDoS attack, which briefly led to performance degradation. In parallel, attempted attacks exploiting a vulnerability in the TYPO3 backend were detected. By rerouting the traffic to a specialised filtering provider and immediately deploying security updates, normal operations were restored within 45 minutes. No personal data was stolen."
Module B: Timeline
The timeline is the heart of forensic reconstruction: precise timestamps detailing actions and system reactions.
Anomaly Detection
Security team alerted
Classification
Countermeasures activated
Normal operations
Module C: Technical Analysis
This is where you gather the facts that drive further analysis and system hardening.
Attack vectors (TTPs): Described using the MITRE ATT&CK Framework, a public knowledge base of adversary tactics
T1498 - Network Denial of Service
└── T1498.001 - Direct Network Flood
└── T1498.002 - Reflection Amplification
T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application
└── TYPO3 Deserialization (CVE-2026-004)IoCs:
DDoS Post-Mortem
DDoS attacks leave no files on disk, so the analysis relies entirely on log data from network devices and filtering providers.
DDoS Metrics
Different metrics reveal different weaknesses. An attack with low bandwidth but an extremely high packet rate can be more devastating than a pure data flood.
| Metric | Unit | Targeted Bottleneck |
|---|---|---|
| Peak Bandwidth | Gbps / Tbps | Uplink capacity |
| Packets per Second | Mpps | Firewall State Tables |
| Requests per Second | RPS | Application Layer |
| Unique Source IPs | Count | Botnet size (if not spoofed) |
| Attack Duration | Minutes/Hours | Resource exhaustion |
Check whether the massive data flood served as a diversion while a stealth attack (e.g. Slowloris) targeted the application at the same time.
Impact Assessment
Severity is assessed across three dimensions:
Operational Impact
- Loss of availability (total outage vs. slowdown)
- Collateral damage on shared infrastructure
- Affected services (API, VPN, email)
Financial Impact
- Costs for traffic filtering (excess usage)
- Lost revenue (for e-commerce)
- Personnel costs for incident handling
Reputational Impact
- Public perception (social media)
- Loss of trust among B2B partners
- Media coverage
DRS: Evaluation of attack complexity on a scale of 1-7:
Automated CVE Correlation
CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) is a standardised system for identifying security vulnerabilities. Each known vulnerability is assigned a unique identifier (e.g., CVE-2024-1234), which is used consistently worldwide – by security researchers, vendors, and IT teams.
Amplification Attacks: When Servers Become Amplifiers
In amplification attacks (also known as reflection attacks), attackers abuse third-party servers as amplifiers. The mechanism works like this:
- A small request is sent to a vulnerable server with a spoofed sender address (the victim's IP).
- The server replies to the apparent sender with a far larger volume of data.
- The victim is flooded with responses it never requested.
The amplification factor captures this ratio: some protocols multiply the traffic 500-fold or more. With just 100 Mbps of bandwidth, an attacker can generate an attack exceeding 50 Gbps.
Why CVE correlation matters:
- Self-assessment: Are vulnerable services running in your own infrastructure? Could your systems be acting as reflectors?
- Threat intelligence: Which known vulnerabilities are being exploited globally right now, and is action required?
| Protocol/Port | CVE | Amplification Factor | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| NTP (123/UDP) | CVE-2013-5211 | 556x | Monlist command |
| Memcached (11211/UDP) | CVE-2018-1000115 | 51.000x | UDP-Reflection |
| SLP (427/UDP) | CVE-2023-29552 | 2.200x | Service Location Protocol |
| DNS (53/UDP) | Multiple | 28-54x | Open Resolver |
| SSDP (1900/UDP) | Multiple | 30x | UPnP Discovery |
Example entry: 'Traffic analysis shows that 40% of the UDP flood originated from source port 427. Deep packet inspection confirmed payloads typical of CVE-2023-29552. This points to a botnet using unpatched VMware ESXi instances as reflectors.'
TYPO3 Forensics
With TYPO3 as an enterprise CMS, one distinction is vital: vulnerabilities in the TYPO3 Core (the responsibility of TYPO3 GmbH/Association) versus vulnerabilities in extensions (the responsibility of the agency or developers). This distinction determines reporting channels and accountability.
System Inventory
Before you start the analysis, document the exact state of the system.
| Aspect | To Document | Security Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| TYPO3 Version | Exact version incl. patch level | LTS vs. Sprint? ELTS available? |
| Installation | Composer vs. Legacy (Non-Composer) | Composer enables auditing |
| PHP Environment | Version, Extensions, disable_functions | Dangerous functions active? |
| Extensions | List of all loaded extensions + versions | Flag abandoned extensions |
| Server | OS, Webserver, PHP-Handler | Known vulnerabilities? |
TYPO3 v11 and older no longer receive security patches without an ELTS contract.
Vulnerability Classes
Forensic Checklist
In the event of a suspected compromise (defacement, spamming, unexplained admin logins):
var/log/typo3_*.log – search for unusual backend logins, IP addressesbe_users and fe_users for unknown entriesfind fileadmin/ -name "*.php" -mtime -7 – PHP files in upload folderstx_scheduler_task for suspicious entriescomposer audit or manual comparison with security bulletinssys_template for injected JavaScript snippetsTYPO3 Security Team
Reporting vulnerabilities to the TYPO3 Security Team follows strict rules. The team works on the principle of responsible disclosure.
Reporting to the Security Team takes thorough preparation. Make sure the suspected vulnerability is documented reproducibly and does not stem from a misconfiguration in your own environment. Poorly researched reports tie up the volunteer team's resources and delay genuine security issues.
Preparatory Measures
Before Reporting
- Keep it off public channels – no posts in Slack, StackOverflow, or forums
- Verify – is the flaw reproducible in a currently supported version?
- Communicate securely – emails must be PGP-encrypted
Encryption Data
PGP ensures that only the Security Team can read the report:
- Key ID: C05FBE60
- Download: typo3.org/security
Email Template
This template meets the TYPO3 Security Team's requirements:
Subject: Suspected Vulnerability in [Extension/Core] - [Short Description]
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
Dear TYPO3 Security Team,
I am writing to report a suspected security vulnerability in accordance
with your coordinated disclosure policy.
1. VULNERABILITY METADATA
-------------------------
Project: [Extension Key or "TYPO3 Core"]
Affected Versions: [e.g., 11.5.0 - 11.5.24]
Tested Version: [Your test environment]After Reporting
Confirmation
Evaluation
Fixing
Advisory
Maintain strict silence between reporting and publication. Any premature discussion opens the door to zero-day attacks and puts every TYPO3 installation worldwide at risk.
Conclusion
A security incident report combines technical excellence with communicative clarity. The template here brings together global standards (NIST/SANS), the specific demands of DDoS attacks, and the TYPO3 security architecture.
DDoS + CVE Mapping
Traffic data becomes actionable threat intelligence. Which global vulnerabilities are being weaponised against us?
TYPO3 Forensics
Standardised reporting channels and forensic depth build trust and strengthen the open-source community.
Faster Response
Consistent application of these templates minimises the recovery time and legal risks.
Security is not a state, but a process – and this report is the protocol of that process.
Using as an AI Skill
The methodology behind this article is available as a machine-readable skill for AI assistants. With it, Claude, ChatGPT, and other LLMs can generate structured incident reports to NIST/SANS standards.
The skill is part of our open-source collection for AI-supported IT workflows: github.com/dirnbauer/webconsulting-skills
Example Prompts for the AI Assistant: